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Abstract 
This paper explores a financial role of Japanese general trading companies (GTCs), 
which act as a central point in a distribution network among group firms. I examine 
Meltzer’s conjecture, which holds that financially strong companies like GTCs increase 
trade receivables and reduce trade payables to shield their trading partners from a 
monetary squeeze. First, I investigate the trade credit granted to each other by GTCs and 
all its trade partners. The panel estimation demonstrates that both trade receivables and 
trade payables decrease during periods of monetary tightness and increase during those 
of monetary ease. In response to a change in a bank-lending indicator, there is little 
difference between trade receivables and payables. Thus GTCs become neither 
net-credit providers nor net-credit takers from this behavior. In other words, interfirm 
financing passing through a GTC’s balance sheet positively correlates with banking 
financing. Therefore, the Meltzer hypothesis does not hold for transactions between 
GTCs and all their trade partners. Instead, gross trade credit functions as a complement 
to macroeconomic bank lending. 
Second, I examine trade credit by dividing GTCs’ trading partners into related 
companies (i.e., subsidiaries and associate firms) and non-related companies. In terms 
of the reactions of trade credit to market financial indicators, I did not find statistically 
significant evidence that the Meltzer hypothesis works in either case. No matter with 
whom a GTC trades, interfirm financing passing through the GTC’s balance sheet 
moves positively in concert with banking financing. A major difference between related 
and non-related companies lies in the way in which trade receivables react to a GTC’s 
individual financial situation (that is, a firm’s individual interest expense rate minus a 
market’s interest rate). An increase in the interest gap induces a GTC to incur extra 
expenses over the market rate. In this situation, a GTC reduces trade receivables to 
non-related firms, but not those to related firms. This behavior eventually works as a 
shield, protecting their related companies from sharing the parent company’s interest 
costs. 
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to explore a financial role of Japanese general trading 
companies (GTCs), called sogo shosha in Japanese, which act as a central point of a 
distribution network among group firms. For example, Flath (2000, p. 351) defines 
“general trading companies” as “[t]he nine large Japanese companies that broker a 
significant amount of Japan’s international trade, extend a substantial amount of trade 
credit within Japan itself, and act as intermediaries in a wide variety of business 
ventures.” 
Table 1 reports the number of GTCs that existed each year during the period from 
March 1976 to March 2008.1
Therefore, one may see the Toyota-Tsusho Corporation replacing the Kanematu 
 Up to around the 1990s, the following nine companies 
were generally recognized as GTCs: Mitsui, Itochu, Kanematsu, Sumitomo, Marubeni, 
Mitsubishi, Nissho-Iwai, Nichimen, and Tomen. However, some GTCs have recently 
merged to form a new company. Specifically, the Nissho-Iwai and Nichimen companies 
merged in 2005 to form a new company called Sojitz; the Toyota-Tsusho Corporation, 
which had been seen as a trading company specializing in exporting and importing 
goods for the Toyota Motor Company, had enjoyed years of sales growth and merged 
with the Tomen Corporation in 2007. During the fiscal year ending in March 2008, 
therefore, the Toyota-Tsusho Corporation achieved the sixth largest sales among 
Japanese trading companies, directly below Itochu’s (see Table 2). On the other hand, 
the Kanematsu Corporation carried out a “structural reform” to downsize the firm’s 
business activities around 2000. 
                                                  
1 Japan’s fiscal year starts at the beginning of April and ends at the end of March; therefore, in their 
financial statements Japanese companies report their income throughout the fiscal year and their 
balance sheet as of the end of March. 
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Corporation as the 2000s’ version of a GTC. Throughout this paper, however, I include 
both companies in my dataset as embraced by a broad definition of GTCs (that is, the 
nine GTCs plus the Toyota-Tsusho Corporation), because the sample period starts at the 
second half of the 1970s and ends in 2008. However, using a narrow definition of GTCs 
I also perform estimations using data excluding the Kanematsu and Toyota-Tsusho 
corporations from the broad definition throughout the entire time period. Estimations in 
Sections 4 and 5 will display the results from both definitions, although they do not 
reveal a distinct difference between the two definitions. Hereafter, in my references to 
“GTCs” I am referring to the broad definition unless I specify otherwise. 
Figure 1 illustrates GTCs’ total sales to all their trading partners and their total 
purchases from them during the time period. Both variables move up and down together 
through almost every year in the period.2
Sheard (1989, p. 319) argues that “trading companies are functioning as quasi-banks 
 This movement in concert indicates that 
GTCs act as a central point of a distribution network from sellers to buyers. The figure 
also depicts GTC’s trade receivables and trade payables. Net trade credit (= the amount 
obtained by subtracting trade payables from trade receivables) had been positive for all 
these years. The average for the period was 2.3 billion yen: the maximum and the 
minimum were 3.8 billion yen in 1985 and 1.2 billion yen in 1979, respectively. Hence 
GTCs function as net-trade creditors who hold other assets less than the sum of other 
liabilities and capital. In other words, GTCs act as credit providers thorough their sales 
and purchases by taking advantage of their strong financial credibility over 
liquidity-constrained companies of a size smaller than GTCs. In this paper, I define 
Japanese GTCs as large firms with access to nonbank funds. 
                                                  
2 Here I define these terms as follows: trade receivables = accounts and notes receivables; trade 
payables = accounts and notes payables.  
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and quasi-insurance agencies in facilitating the provision of trade credit and the 
diversification of default risks associated with that trade credit.”3
Using the data for U.S. firms, Meltzer (1960, p. 429) argues, “when money was 
tightened, firms with relatively large cash balances increased the average length of time 
for which credit was extended. And this extension of trade credit appears to have 
favored those against whom credit rationing is said to discriminate.” In other words, the 
adaptive reaction of trade credit extended by large firms could shield small 
liquidity-constrained firms from a monetary squeeze and then hinder the restrictive 
monetary policy. Here I call this “the Meltzer conjecture,” following Marotta (1997), 
who tested for the effect on trade credit between Italian firms. If the Meltzer effect 
works during monetary contractions, it indicates that trade receivables increase at 
financially unconstrained firms (e.g., large and/or quoted firms) and decrease at 
financially constrained firms (e.g., small and/or unquoted firms), and that trade payables 
decrease at the former firms and increase at the latter firms.  
 In general, sellers’ 
ability to collect information about buyers’ business conditions can mitigate the costs of 
extending trade credit. In addition, Ono (2001) points out that transactions with buyers 
enable sellers to more accurately and more promptly assess buyers’ default risk than 
buyers’ financial institutions are able to do. Although his paper focuses on the trade 
credit of manufacturing firms, Ono also suggests that it would be interesting to analyze 
the trade credit of trading companies. 
Table 3 reports recent empirical studies using microdata or semiaggregated data.4
                                                  
3 Similar arguments can be found in the literature on business studies; for example, Sasago (1979) 
and Furuyama (1998).  
 
The conjecture is not widely accepted. The results from testing for the hypothesis 
4 Not every article explicitly refers to the Meltzer effect. But all the papers listed focus on the 
relationship between trade credit and monetary policy (or bank lending) . 
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depend on the country, the time period, or the criterion used to differentiate between 
liquidity-constrained firms and unconstrained ones. 
For the U.K., Kohler et al. (2000) and Mateut et al. (2006) report evidence that is 
consistent with the Meltzer conjecture. For Italy, however, Marotta (1997) and Rondi et 
al. (1998) find evidence that contradicts the conjecture. For other countries, 
investigations reveal mixed conclusions.  
Kohler et al. (2000) demonstrate that net trade credit (= trade receivables minus 
payables) falls at U.K.-quoted firms when monetary conditions are tighter. However, 
Choi and Kim (2005) report that large U.S. firms do not necessarily actively increase 
net trade credit more than smaller firms. Furthermore, Nielsen (2002) divides large U.S. 
firms into those with a bond rating and those without. He then reports evidence that 
large firms without a bond rating use trade payables as an alternative to bank loans. This 
implies that only large firms having a bond rating are free from credit constraints. 
Regarding Japanese data, Ogawa (2003) reports that when monetary contraction 
occurs, large-sized firms grant trade credit to medium-sized firms but not to smaller 
firms.5
                                                  
5 His evidence somewhat resembles Cunningham’s (2005), in which medium-wealth firms 
substitute bank loans for trade credit but low-wealth firms use trade credit as a complement to bank 
loans.  
 Uesugi and Yamashiro (2006) examine the aggregation data of Japanese 
large-sized wholesalers, which include GTCs. They examine synchronous movement 
between trade receivables and bank lending. Figure 7 in their paper reveals strong 
negative correlations in the early 1970s: namely, wholesalers’ trade receivables function 
as a substitute for bank loans to their customers. Afterward, however, a positive 
correlation (trade credit’s complementary function to bank loans for the customers) has 
frequently appeared up to and beyond the year 2000. 
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Many researchers have investigated the Japanese main-bank lending system, which 
serves as a center of financial keiretsu (corporate networks) in Japan.6 However, there 
is another type of keiretsu, such as corporate distribution networks among nonfinancial 
companies. Like main banks, the GTCs hold significant shares of many nonfinancial 
firms whose businesses are closely related to the GTCs’ transactions.7
Figure 2 illustrates all GTCs’ sales to and their purchases from their own related 
companies (= their subsidiaries and associate companies)
  
8
Figure 3 depicts all GTCs’ trade receivables and payables for related companies and 
those for non-related companies. In accordance with sales and purchases in Figure 2, 
trade receivables and payables for related companies have exhibited more stable 
movement than have those for non-related companies. For related companies, net trade 
credit (trade receivables minus payables) became a negative value in 1976, 1977, and 
1979. However, in all other years the numbers have been positive. In 2008, the net 
credit for related companies was 880,931 million yen, which is greater than that for 
non-related companies: 641,138 million yen. We should pay more attention to trade 
credit for related firms. 
 and non-related companies 
(the balance of trading partners). Both sales and purchases for related companies have 
exhibited more stable movement than have sales and purchases for non-related 
companies. On average, 14.2% of total sales are sales to related companies, and 19.2% 
of total purchases are from related companies. We cannot neglect those volumes, 
although those with non-related companies are much larger.  
                                                  
6 For example, see Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991) and Hoshi (1994). 
7 See Toyokeizai Data Bank (1996). 
8 With some exceptional cases, a firm’s subsidiary is usually a company in which the firm owns 
more than fifty percent of voting shares. Similarly, a firm’s associate company is usually a company 
in which the firm owns between 20% and 50% of voting shares.  
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To my knowledge, few researchers9 have paid attention to the financial aspect of 
Japanese GTCs. Recall that GTCs serve as a central point of corporate distribution 
networks.10, 11
Section 2 introduces my data and specifies estimation equations. Section 3 performs 
unit root tests for variables used in the regressions. Section 4 reports the empirical 
results for trade credit given to and received from all of the GTCs’ trading partners. 
Section 5 divides trading partners into related and non-related companies and examines 
trade credit given to and received from the two different types of partners. Finally, 
Section 6 concludes the paper with a suggestion for future research. 
 Using micro data, this paper sheds light on this aspect from a view of 
trade credit practices a la Meltzer, not only on trade receivables but also on trade 
payables. The examination of trade credit on the asset and liability sides simultaneously 
allows us to evaluate how a GTC passes trade credit from trade payables to receivables 
as interfirm financing corresponding to bank lending. I will then use micro data to 
capture an individual firm’s behavior and examine a GTC’s ties with its trade partners 
by separating the partners into related and non-related companies. In addition, I examine 
the data with and without the Kanematsu and Toyota-Tsusho corporations, which during 
the past thirty years have made more dramatic structural changes than any other GTC.  
 
2. The Data and the Specification 
This section specifies a regression form and introduces the data that I use. Because I 
                                                  
9 Uesugi (2004), and Uesugi and Yamashiro (2006) examine a wide variety of GTCs’ financial roles, 
including trade credit, stock investments, loans, and loan guarantees. 
10 Strictly speaking, investigation of the Meltzer effect on trade credit must focus on the relationship 
between firms that are financially constrained and those that are not. Although the two types of firm 
are not separable in the data, it is natural to presume that most of the GTCs’ trade partners are not as 
financially unconstrained as the GTCs. 
11 For example, Deloof and Jegers (1996) examine trade credit used within European corporate 
groups and discover a financial factor in determining the amount of trade credit. 
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focus on the individual level of corporate financing behavior, it is best to examine 
financial statements reported by each GTC. The following estimation therefore uses the 
Nikkei Needs CD-ROM database for firms’ annual financial statements.12 The Japanese 
accounting rule defines “related companies (Kanren firms)” as those including 
subsidiaries (Kogaisha) and associate companies (Kankei firms). Since 1976, all firms 
have reported sales to and purchases from companies related to the firms. Therefore, the 
sample period starts in March 1976 and ends in March 2008.13
As illustrated in Table 1, the panel data for all trade partners is unbalanced. In 
addition, some GTCs do not report information for transactions with related companies 
at some years. Therefore, panel data sets for related and non-related companies become 
more unbalanced than the data set for all trade partners. 
  
In fact, the terms of trade credit vary with each transaction. In each case, they depend 
on the type of commodity, the trade partners, and the business conditions at the micro 
and macro levels.14
 
 However, the financial statements do not break down a firm’s trade 
credit by individual contracts. Thus, at best, I explore determinants of trade credit for 
their related and non-related companies. 
2-A. Trade Credit for All Trading Partners  
At the firm level, I investigate the way in which the amount of trade credit is 
influenced by both transactional and financial factors. Table 4 describes all the variables 
used in this paper. The following are the specifications for a GTC (= firm i) to supply 
                                                  
12 For some portion of my data, I referred directly to the GTCs’ annual financial statements, from 
which the Nikkei Needs database collects. 
13 For transactions with non-related companies, I calculate the numbers by subtracting those for 
related companies from those for all trade partners. 
14 See Kinyu-Zaisei (1996) for the terms standardized in each industrial sector. See Emery and Ariga 
(1996) for a survey, conducted by mail, of managers at Japanese trading companies. 
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trade credit to all its customers, (1), and to demand trade credit from all its vendors, (2): 
(1) dlnTRi,t =α0 +α1 dlnSi,t +α2 (lnTRi,t-1– lnSi,t-1)+α3 IGAPi,t-1 +α4 Mt + vi+ eit  
(+)  (–)     (–)  ( –) 
(2) dlnTPi,t =β0 +β1 dlnPi,t +β2 (lnTPi,t-1– lnPi,t-1)+β3 IGAPi,t-1 +β4 Mt + vi+ eit. 
(+)  (–)     (?)    (+) 
Here, d denotes the first difference of the variable. Expected signs are in parentheses.  
In equations (1) and (2), the coefficients α1 and β1 indicate the transactional factors 
that are expected to be positive. The terms (lnTRi,t-1– lnSi,t-1) and (lnTPi,t-1– lnPi,t-1) 
incorporate long-term adjustments toward a desired ratio of trade receivables to sales 
and of trade payables to purchases, respectively. Both coefficients, α2 and β2, are 
expected to be minus. Regarding this error correction format, I follow Guariglia and 
Mateut (2006), who estimate an inventory function by using as one of the explanatory 
variables the value of subtracting a logarithm of lagged sales from a logarithm of lagged 
inventory.15
                                                  
15 Guariglia and Mateut (2006) estimate inventory investment equations for U.K. quoted companies. 
They report that financially constrained firms can finance inventory investment with trade payables 
when tight monetary policy makes it harder for those firms to obtain bank loans.  
 Considering the fundamental nature of the way in which trade credit 
originates from transactional activities, it is natural to suppose that a long-term 
adjustment process lies in a relationship between trade receivables and sales and 
between trade payables and purchases. The coefficients α3 and β3 capture a financial 
factor at an individual firm level. For a firm’s individual financial factor, IGAPi,t-1 
denotes a interest gap obtained by subtracting a market interest rate from firm i’s 
interest expense rate. I use the lagged variable not to have a contemporaneous 
correlation between IGAPi,t and Mt in the explanatory variables. Here, I presume α3 to 
be negative, although the strong financial credibility of a firm like a GTC does not seem 
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to make the short-term finances such as trade credit very responsive to its own financial 
situation. However, a sign of β3 is indeterminate. It becomes a positive number if firm i 
substitutes trade payables for bank borrowing as IGAPi,t-1 increases. On the other hand, 
it could be negative if firm i wants to reduce the outstanding debts, including trade 
payables, as IGAPi,t-1 increases.  
Finally, α4 and β4 demonstrate the effect of a macroeconomic bank-lending indicator, 
Mt. If α4 < 0 < β4, a GTC increases trade receivables and decreases trade payables when 
bank lending conditions become restrictive at the macroeconomic level (i.e., Mt 
decreases). This behavior will be consistent with the Meltzer conjecture. Even if 0 < α4 
< β4 or α4 < β4 < 0, however, a GTC behaves in accordance with the hypothesis. If 0 < 
α4 < β4, a GTC decreases trade receivables less than it does trade payables during tight 
monetary markets. If α4 < β4 < 0, a GTC increases trade receivables more than it does 
trade payables during monetary contraction. Net trade credit (trade receivables minus 
payables) increases in either scenario. Hence, I conclude that the Meltzer hypothesis 
holds in terms of absolute change if α4 < 0 < β4, and that it holds in terms of relative 
change if 0 < α4 < β4 or α4 < β4 < 0. Although I expect the signs in (1) and (2) in terms of 
absolute change, this classification is quite important. This is so because interfirm 
financing passing from a GTC’s trade payables to receivables is indeterminate, negative, 
or positive, if α4 < 0 < β4, 0 < α4 < β4, or α4 < β4 < 0, respectively.16
 
  
2-B. Trade Credit for Related and Non-Related Companies 
Here I separate the trade receivables of (1) into those granted to related companies 
and those given to non-related companies. Similarly, I divide the trade payables of (2) 
                                                  
16 Apart from the Meltzer effect, there is also a debate about how the aggregate quantity of gross 
trade credit reacts to a monetary shock. See Ramey (1992) and Choi and Kim (2005), for example. 
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into those received from related companies and those given by non-related companies. 
Because GTCs hold significant shares of the related companies, they have an economic 
incentive to ease their related firms’ financial constraints through granting them more 
trade credit and expecting less trade credit from them when the financial market 
situation tightens.  
Therefore I specify a GTC’s (= firm i’s) supply of trade credit to its related companies 
who are customers as (3) and its demand for trade credit from its related companies who 
are vendors as (4): 
(3) dlnTRRi,t =γ0 +γ1 dlnSRi,t +γ2 (lnTRRi,t-1– lnSRi,t-1)+γ3 IGAPi,t-1 +γ4 Mt + vi+ eit  
(+)    (–)   (–)    ( –) 
(4) dlnTPRi,t =δ0 +δ1 dlnPRi,t +δ2 (lnTPRi,t-1– lnPRi,t-1)+δ3 IGAPi,t-1 +δ4 Mt + vi+ eit. 
(+)    (–)   (?)    (+) 
Moreover, (5) illustrates a GTC’s (= firm i’s) supply of trade credit to its non-related 
companies who are customers, and (6) describes its demand for trade credit from its 
non-related companies who are vendors: 
(5) dlnTRNi,t =ζ0 +ζ1 dlnSNi,t +ζ2 (lnTRNi,t-1– lnSNi,t-1)+ζ3 IGAPi,t-1 +ζ4 Mt + vi+ eit  
(+)    (–)   (–)    (–) 
(6) dlnTPNi,t =η0 +η1 dlnPNi,t +η2 (lnTPNi,t-1– lnPNi,t-1)+η3 IGAPi,t-1 +η4 Mt + vi+ eit. 
(+)    (–)   (?)    (+) 
Expected signs are in parentheses. I presume signs of all coefficients to be the same as 
(1) and (2). Concerning related firms, however, I expect γ3 to become less significantly 
different from zero than that in (1). In addition,γ4 and δ4 are expected to become more 
significantly different from zero than those in (1) and (2). Regarding non-related firms, I 
predict that ζ3 will become more significantly different from zero than that in (1). In 
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addition, ζ4 and η4 are expected to become less significantly different from zero than 
those in (1) and (2). 
   
3. Unit Root Tests 
Before estimating the determinants of trade credit, I test to determine whether a 
panel-based variable has a unit root process. To aid in determining the nature of this 
process, Table 5 reports the Levin, Lin, and Chu (LLC) statistic and the Im, Pesaran, 
and Shin (IPS) statistic.17
In panel (a), the first-differenced logarithms reveal a stationary process in all cases of 
both tests. In panel (b), a null of unit root is rejected in all four cases for (lnTPi,t-1– 
lnPi,t-1) and (lnTPRi,t-1– lnPRi,t-1); in three cases for (lnTRRi,t-1– lnSRi,t-1) and (lnTPNi,t-1– 
lnPNi,t-1), and; in one case for (lnTRi,t-1– lnSi,t-1) and (lnTRNi,t-1– lnSNi,t-1). Panel (c) 
reports that the financial variables IGAPi,t and Mt have no unit root process in all cases 
of both tests. Hence I proceed to the following estimation by concluding that a unit root 
problem does not occur in the variables used in the specifications. 
 The LLC test sets up a null hypothesis of a common unit root 
process across cross-sections; then a rejection of the null reaches the conclusion that 
there is no unit root in the panel-based variable. The IPS test allows for individual unit 
root processes across cross-sections; then a rejection of the null demonstrates that there 
are some cross-sections without a unit root. 
 
4. Trade Credit Granted Between GTCs and All the Trading Partners 
In the panel data set, the sample period (T) runs from 1977 to 2008 (=32 years) and 
the number of firms (N) is 13 for each equation. Given the small number of firms, I 
                                                  
17 See Levin, Lin, and Chu (2002), and Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003), respectively. 
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estimate the model with fixed effects. When T goes to infinity for fixed N, Arellano 
(2003) suggests applying Newey and West’s standard error corrections to a fixed-effect 
panel-data estimation. Hence, Table 6-A reports the least squares estimations with fixed 
effects and Newey and West’s standard errors, which are robust to cross-sectional 
dependence, heteroskedasticity, and serial correlation of arbitrary forms. I specify the 
truncation lag as 3 (=floor(4(T/100)2/9, where T=32 in this paper) by following Newey 
and West (1994). 
In equation (1), the estimated coefficient on dlnSi,t and that on (lnTRi,t-1– lnSi,t-1) have 
expected signs at the 1% level of statistical significance. As transactional factors, 
therefore, we can say that the sales and the long-term adjustment of trade receivables to 
sales are critical determinants of trade receivables. In addition, the estimate for IGAPi,t-1 
demonstrates a negative coefficient, as expected, at the 1% statistical significance level. 
Even though the financial credibility of a GTC may be strong, a change in its own 
individual financial situation relative to financial markets does influence trade 
receivables. The estimated coefficient on Mt has an unexpected sign with the 1% level 
of statistical significance. One unit increase in Mt indicates a 0.2 percent increase in 
trade receivables.18
                                                  
18 For example, Mt was 33 in 1989 (in the bubble economy), -20 in 1999 (around the business cycle 
trough dated at January 1999), 21 in 2007 (near the most recent business cycle peak dated, 
tentatively, at October 2007). The effect of Mt on dlnTRi,t is 6.6%, -4.0%, and 4.2%, respectively. 
 Contrary to expectations, a GTC’s trade receivables decrease as 
bank lending becomes restrictive at the macroeconomic level. In other words, the trade 
credit granted by a GTC serves as a complement to bank loans for the GTC’s customers. 
This evidence concurs with Uesugi and Yamashiro (2006), who demonstrate that the 
aggregate amount of trade receivables of large-sized wholesalers behaves as a 
complement to bank loans. 
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For estimated coefficients in equation (2), the estimated signs and statistical 
significance appear to be the same as in equation (1) except for that of IGAPi,t-1. For 
IGAPi,t-1 , the statistical insignificance of the coefficient close to zero may indicate 
offsetting results from the positive and negative effects that an increase in IGAPi,t-1 has 
on trade payables. A positive effect will appear if, as IGAPi,t-1 increases, a GTC switches 
its financial source from bank borrowing to trade payables. A negative effect will 
emerge as IGAPi,t-1 increases if this motivates a GTC to reduce its outstanding debts, 
including trade payables. 
As expected, Mt’s coefficient has a positive sign. Hence a GTC refrains from 
receiving as much trade payables from its vendors when bank loans become less 
available to borrowers in general. In other words, as a GTC’s payments reduce its trade 
payables, this functions as a substitute for bank loans to those who sell goods to the 
GTC. 
Finally, I perform the Wald test, the null hypothesis of which is no difference between 
equations (1) and (2) in the estimated coefficients on Mt. To conduct this test, I follow 
Blackwell (2005) to estimate (1) and (2) simultaneously as a system of the SUR 
(Seemingly Unrelated Regressions).19
                                                  
19 The results from system regressions are almost identical to single-equation regression except for 
minor changes in standard errors. In the table, I report the estimated coefficient and standard errors 
for Mt only. The entire results for this multiple equation regression are available from the author on 
request. 
 At the bottom of the table, the system regression 
reports that the p-value of the Wald statistic is 0.9618, by which I concludes that Mt’s 
effect on trade receivables is equal to its effect on trade payables. Net trade credit (= 
trade receivables – trade payables) at a GTC does not respond to a change in Mt. In 
terms of either absolute or relative change, the Meltzer effect does not emerge from this 
behavior. In addition, a decrease in Mt (i.e., monetary tightening) induces a decrease in 
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trade receivables and payables. The reduction in trade credit on both sides suggests that 
interfirm financing moves in tandem with banking financing.20
Table 6-B applies the same estimation methods as those in Table 6-A to the data, as 
narrowly defined—excluding the Kanematsu and the Toyota-Tsusho corporations from 
the GTCs. The statistical significance level for the coefficients on (lnTRi,t-1－lnSi,t-1) and 
on IGAPi,t-1 changed from 1% to 5% in equation (1). However, other major results are 
not influenced even by dropping the two companies that had undergone greater 
structural changes than any other GTC during the sample period. 
 One may say that trade 
credit at the gross level (=min[trade receivables, trade payables]) functions as a 
complement to macroeconomic bank lending.  
 
5. Trade Credit Granted Between GTCs and the Related Companies 
In the preceding section, I examined trade credit granted to all of the GTCs’ 
customers and received from all their vendors. This section investigates trade credit by 
dividing their trading partners into related firms and non-related firms. As demonstrated 
in the previous section, the Meltzer hypothesis does not hold for trade credit with all 
trade partners. Here I offer a new hypothesis that GTCs may financially help their 
related companies when banking loans become restrictive (i.e., γ4 in (3) < δ4 in (4)). 
Tables 7-A and 8-A illustrate the LS fixed-effects estimation with Newey and West’s 
standard errors for (3), (4), (5), and (6). First, estimated signs and their statistical 
significance in (5) and (6) in Table 8-A are identical to those in (1) and (2) in Table 6-A. 
Second, estimated signs and their statistical significance in (3) and (4) in Table 7-A are 
almost the same as those in (1) and (2) in Table 6-A. A prominent exception is that the 
                                                  
20 This evidence contradicts Choi and Kim (2005), who report that U.S. firms increase accounts 
receivable and accounts payable when the financial market tightens. 
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coefficient on IGAPi,t-1 in (3) is statistically insignificant. Regarding this coefficient, the 
1% significance level with a negative sign is for non-related firms in Table 8-A; the 
statistical insignificance is for related firms in Table 7-A. The difference indicates that a 
GTC directs an increase in its own financial costs toward non-related companies by 
granting less trade credit to them. On the other hand, related companies do not have to 
share in the increase in the GTC’s financial costs, as there is no change in the trade 
credit they receive from the GTC. 
As detailed in the previous section, I use the Wald test to compare the response of 
trade receivables with that of trade payables when Mt changes. The test statistic (p-value 
= 0.9127) results in an acceptance of the null hypothesis, under which the coefficient on 
Mt in (5) is equal to that in (6). As concluded in trade credit for all trade partners, the 
Meltzer hypothesis for non-related companies is not borne out in terms of either 
absolute or relative change.  
For related companies, estimated γ4 in (3)[=0.00118] < [0.002209=] estimated δ4 in (4), 
as I expected, and the Meltzer effect seems to work in terms of relative change. 
However, the p-value of the Wald statistic is 0.3474. It is much lower than in the test for 
non-related companies, but not statistically significant enough to reject the equality 
hypothesis. Here again, the Meltzer hypothesis does not hold in coefficients on Mt.  
Tables 7-B and 8-B display the estimation results from using the data excluding the 
Kanematsu and the Toyota-Tsusho corporations. However, the main results are virtually 
the same for both the broad definition of GTCs and the narrow one.  
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
This paper raised the question: do GTCs make any adjustment in their use of trade 
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credit in response to micro- or macroeconomic changes in financial conditions? Because 
the answer was found to be yes, it further examined whether their behavior is consistent 
with the Meltzer conjecture. Our panel estimation demonstrates that during periods of 
monetary contraction a GTC reduces both the amount of trade receivables and the 
amount of trade payables. In terms of absolute change, one may say that trade credit 
granted from a GTC serves as a complement to bank loans for those who purchase from 
the GTC. On the other hand, a GTC’s payments, by reducing its trade payables, function 
as a substitute for bank loans to those who sell to the GTC. If you look at the trade 
receivables, the complementary relation to bank loans disproves the Meltzer hypothesis. 
Looking at trade payables, however, their serving as a substitute for bank loans lends 
support to the hypothesis.  
To clarify these mixed results, I examined the conjecture in terms of relative change. 
It demonstrated that trade receivables and payables move together tightly in response to 
a bank-lending indicator. In conclusion, a decrease in trade credit on both sides during a 
monetary squeeze suggests that interfirm financing moves in concert with banking 
financing. Hence trade credit at the gross level functions as a complement to 
macroeconomic bank lending. 
Second, I examined trade credit by dividing GTCs’ trading partners into related 
companies and non-related companies. The GTCs’ response to financial market 
indicators—in terms of altering trade credit for non-related companies—was the same 
as their alteration of trade credit for all trade partners. For related companies, the way in 
which trade credit reacts to a change in bank lending appeared to be consistent with the 
Meltzer hypothesis in terms of relative change. However, it was not statistically 
significant enough to confirm the hypothesis.  
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A major difference between related and non-related companies lies in the way in 
which trade receivables react to a GTC’s individual financial situation. When a GTC 
must incur its own additional interest expenses over market interest rates, the GTC 
reduces trade receivables to non-related firms but not to related firms. This behavior 
eventually works as a shield, protecting its related companies from sharing the parent 
company’s interest costs.  
One should remember that a GTC’s trade credit for its related companies represents 
only one of the financial relationships between the GTC and those companies. GTCs 
provide related companies with financial assistances such as loans, loan guarantees, or 
corporate bonds. Although it is not easy to obtain such financial data separated into 
related and non-related companies, further research should be devoted to investigating 
the financial relationship between GTCs and related companies. In financial measures 
other than trade credit, one may observe Meltzer-like behavior during periods of 
monetary tightness. I leave this exploration to future research. 
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Table 1. The Number of General Trading Companies 
Company Mitsui Itochu
Itochu+
Ataka
Kanemats
u
Sumitomo Marubeni Mitsubishi
Nissho-
Iwai
Nichimen Sojitz Tomen
Toyota-
Tsusho(2)
Toyota-
Tsusho(1)
Total firms
F.Y.
ending in
March
A B(1) B(2) C D E F G H
I
(=G+H)
J K
L
(=J+K)
1976 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10
1977 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10
1978 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10
1979 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10
1980 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10
1981 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10
1982 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10
1983 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10
1984 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10
1985 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10
1986 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10
1987 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10
1988 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10
1989 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10
1990 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10
1991 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10
1992 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10
1993 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10
1994 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10
1995 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10
1996 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10
1997 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10
1998 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10
1999 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10
2000 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10
2001 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10
2002 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10
2003 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10
2004 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10
2005 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9
2006 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9
2007 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8
2008 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8  
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Companies in Sales Order (mill. yen)
Company Sales Company Sales Company Sales Company Sales
1 Mitsubishi 12,066,794 1 Sumitomo 21,403,613 1 Mitsui 10,658,978 1 Mitsui 12,291,218
2 Mitsui 11,208,181 2 Itochu 20,532,742 2 Mitsubishi 10,485,212 2 Mitsubishi 10,832,868
3 Itochu 8,862,034 3 Mitsui 20,300,091 3 Itochu 10,252,007 3 Sumitomo 6,388,976
4 Marubeni 8,388,063 4 Marubeni 18,248,246 4 Sumitomo 9,660,105 4 Marubeni 6,193,597
5 Sumitomo 7,600,605 5 Mitsubishi 16,614,012 5 Marubeni 8,858,836 5 Itochu 5,625,287
6 Nissho-Iwai 5,769,756 6 Nissho-Iwai 15,047,507 6 Nissho-Iwai 5,996,546 6 Toyota-Tsusho 4,862,155
7 Tomen 2,789,789 7 Tomen 6,324,318 7 Tomen 2,388,588 7 Sojitz 3,480,490
8 Kanematsu 2,760,184 8 Nichimen 5,893,718 8 Nichimen 2,227,117 8 Kanematsu 564,100
9 Nichimen 2,289,780 9 Kanematsu 5,501,768 9 Toyota-Tsusho 1,550,897
10 Toyota-Tsusho 865,870 10 Toyota-Tsusho 1,957,314 10 Kanematsu 947,443
Source: Financial Statements
1979Apl-1980Mar 1989Apl-1990Mar 1999Apl-2000Mar 2007Apl-2008Mar
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Table 3. Empirical Studies on the Meltzer Conjecture
Article Country DataFrequency Time Period Data Type and Grouping
Evidence to the
Meltzer conjecure
Cunningham(2005) Canada annual 1988-1998 microdata for public andprivate firms partly favorable
Marotta (1997) Italy annual 1982-1993 aggregation by size and
sector
unfavorable
Rondi et al.  (1998) Italy annual 1968-1991 aggregation by size unfavorable
Ogawa (2003) Japan quarterly 1975:Q1-1998:Q1 aggregation by size partly favorable
Uesugi and Yamashiro (2006) Japan quarterly 1967:Q1-2003:Q3
aggregation of large-
sized wholsalers
unfavorable since
the 1980s
Kohler et al.  (2000) U.K. annual 1983-1996 microdata for quoted
firms
favorable
Mateut et al. (2006) U.K. annual 1990-1999 microdata from theFAME database favorable
Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) USA Quarterly 1976:Q1-1991:Q2 aggregation by size unfavorable
Nielsen (2002) USA quarterly 1959-1992 aggregation by size favorable
annual 1973-1992 aggregation by bond
Choi and Kim (2005) USA quarterly 1975:Q4-1997:Q4
microdata from
Compustat files
(S&P500, Non-S&P
unfavorable
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Table 4. Notation and Data Description
Variable Description Original Data Sources
TRi,t
Firm i's trade receivables (= accounts and notes receivables) granted to all its buyers outstanding at the end of
March of year t
financial statements
TRRi,t
Firm i's trade receivables (= accounts and notes receivables) granted to its related firms (buyers) outstanding
at the end of March of year t
financial statements
TRNi,t
Firm i's Trade receivables (= accounts and notes receivables) granted to its non-related firms (buyers)
outstanding at the end of March of year t
financial statements
TPi,t
Firm i's trade payables (= accounts and notes payables) received from all its sellers outstanding at the end of
March of year t
financial statements
TPRi,t
Firm i's trade payables (= accounts and notes payables) received from its related firms (sellers) outstanding at
the end of March of year t
financial statements
TPNi,t
Firm i's Trade payables (= accounts and notes payables) received from its non-related firms (sellers)
outstanding at the end of March of year t
financial statements
S i,t
The total amount sold by  firm i  from April of year t-1  to March of year t financial statements
SR i,t
The amount sold by  firm i  to its related firms from April of year t-1  to March of year t financial statements
SN i,t
The amount sold by  firm i  to its non-related firms from April of year t-1  to March of year t financial statements
Pi,t
The total amount purchased by firm i  from April of year t-1  to March of year t financial statements
PRi,t
The amount purchased by firm i  from its related firms from April of year t-1  to March of year t financial statements
PNi,t
The amount purchased by firm i  from its non-related firms from April of year t-1  to March of year t financial statements
IGAPi,t
 firm i's interest expenses to interest-bearing debts ratio at year t - Call rate(collateralized overnight)'s fiscal
yearly (from April of year t-1  to March of year t ) average
Bank of Japan for call
rate
where firm i 's interest expenses to interest-bearing debts ratio at year t
= (firm i 's interest expenses from April of yeat t-1  to March of year t )*2/ (firms i 's interest-bearing debts at
the end of March of year t-1  + interest-bearing debts at the end of March of year t )
financial statements
M t
Monetary policy indicator at year t. An increase in Mt indicates an easy-monetary policy. The Bank of Japan
asks the sample firms if banks are willing (X1), normally ready (X2), or  unwilling (X3) to lend to them. Then,
it reports the index calculated as: (the number of firms answering (X1) – the number of firms answering
(X3))/the number of respondents. The data are a percentage index ranging from +100 to -100. As a
representative indicator for GTCs' trading partners on an annual basis, I use the index for manufacturing firms
at the forth quarter of year t-1.
TANKAN (by Bank
of Japan)
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Figure 5. Panel Unit Root Test
Statistic
Lag
length
selection
Statistic
Lag
length
selection
Statistic
Lag
length
selection
Statistic
Lag
length
selection
(a)
dlnTR -7.2354 0-4 *** -9.0623 0-1 *** -6.4280 0-4 *** -7.4603 0-1 ***
dlnTRR -9.4169 0-3 *** -9.4144 0-2 *** -9.4712 0-3 *** -9.9220 0-2 ***
dlnTRN -7.6926 0-4 *** -8.1644 0-3 *** -6.8452 0-4 *** -7.5669 0-3 ***
dlnTP -10.3421 0 *** -8.7234 0-3 *** -9.0117 0 *** -7.8883 0-3 ***
dlnTPR -15.4011 0-1 *** -13.8527 0-1 *** -14.5383 0-1 *** -13.3999 0-1 ***
dlnTPN -10.5590 0-1 *** -8.3621 0-3 *** -9.5762 0-1 *** -8.2686 0-3 ***
dlnS -8.5722 0-1 *** -9.9270 0-0 *** -6.8410 0-1 *** -8.0719 0 ***
dlnSR -8.2050 0-2 *** -8.4268 0-2 *** -7.3375 0-2 *** -7.8704 0-2 ***
dlnSN -8.4226 0-1 *** -9.2165 0-1 *** -7.5043 0-1 *** -8.2096 0-1 ***
dlnP -8.5822 0-1 *** -9.7426 0 *** -6.9324 0-1 *** -8.0764 0 ***
dlnPR -11.4931 0-1 *** -12.0595 0-1 *** -10.0881 0-1 *** -10.3532 0-1 ***
dlnPN -8.8394 0-1 *** -9.7702 0-1 *** -7.5619 0-1 *** -8.2244 0-1 ***
(b)
lnTR-lnS -1.5056 0-1 * -0.4837 0-1 -0.4547 0-1 0.9014 0-1
lnTRR-lnSR -0.9673 0-2 -2.0975 0-1 ** -1.4865 0-2 * -2.0975 0-1 **
lnTRN-lnSN -1.9966 0-1 ** 0.2560 0-3 -1.1823 0-1 0.2159 0-3
lnTP-lnP -3.3667 0-1 *** -1.9877 0-1 ** -3.3667 0-1 *** -1.9877 0-1 **
lnTPR-lnPR -4.2208 0-0 *** -3.2160 0-0 *** -4.0811 0-0 *** -2.7979 0-0 ***
lnTPN-lnPN -3.6911 0-0 *** -2.3375 0-0 *** -2.4381 0-0 *** 0.0569 0-0
(c)
igap -6.9472 0-0 *** -11.0156 0-3 *** -5.2038 0-0 *** -5.0800 0-1 ***
M -10.0250 4 *** -9.9887 1 *** -9.1557 1 *** -7.3382 1 ***
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level.
**　Statistically significant at the 5% level.
*    Statistically significant at the 10% level.
c H0：Unit root, H1: No unit root
d H0：Unit root, H1: Some cross section without unit root
a Individual intercepts are included. All the tests are computed with automatic lag length selection relying on Schwarz' Information
Criterion (SIC) and with a maximum lag length of 4.
b The Newey-West bandwidth selection method based the Bartlett
Levin, Lin & Chu (2002) t* a, b, c Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) W-stat a, d
No trend Individual trend No trend Individual trend
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Table 6-A Trade Credit granted to and received from a GTC's all trading partners
(GTCs including the Kanematsu and the Toyota-Tsusho corporations)
Eq. (1) Eq. (2)
Dep. var. dlnTRi,t Dep. var. dlnTPi,t
Exp. var. Coef. Std. Err. Exp. var. Coef. Std. Err.
dlnSi,t 0.5670297 0.038828 *** dlnPi,t 0.6764345 0.052279 ***
lnTRi,t-1-lnSi,t-1 -0.066469 0.017871 *** lnTPi,t-1-lnPi,t-1 -0.088665 0.221786 ***
IGAPi,t-1 -0.014698 0.005293 *** IGAPi,t-1 -0.000832 0.006696
M t 0.0020152 0.000404 *** M t 0.002043 0.000417 ***
Obs. 308 Obs. 309
Time-period 1977-2008 Time-period 1977-2008
Num. of firms 13 Num. of firms 13
R2 0.4915 R2 0.468
System Regression of eqs. (1) and (2). 
(1) Coef. Std. Err. (2) Coef. Std. Err.
M t 0.002015 0.000404 *** M t 0.002043 0.000417 ***
F(1, 583) = 0.00 Prob > F =  0.9618
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level.
**　Statistically significant at the 5% level.
*    Statistically significant at the 10% level.
1) Fixed effects are not reported.
Table 6-B. Trade Credit granted to and received from a GTC's all trading partner
(GTCs excluding the Kanematsu and the Toyota-Tsusho corporations)
Eq. (1) Eq. (2)
Dep. var. dlnTRi,t Dep. var. dlnTPi,t
Exp. var. Coef. Std. Err. Exp. var. Coef. Std. Err.
dlnSi,t 0.5337442 0.045684 *** dlnPi,t 0.6143163 0.06319 ***
lnTRi,t-1-lnSi,t-1 -0.053186 0.021507 ** lnTPi,t-1-lnPi,t-1 -0.068077 0.023809 ***
IGAPi,t-1 -0.015792 0.006424 ** IGAPi,t-1 0.0003655 0.007621
M t 0.0021799 0.000475 *** M t 0.0021671 0.000421 ***
Obs. 245 Obs. 246
Time-period 1977-2008 Time-period 1977-2008
Num. of firms 10 Num. of firms 10
R2 0.442 R2 0.4189
System Regression of eqs. (1) and (2). 
(1) Coef. Std. Err. (2) Coef. Std. Err.
M t 0.0021799 0.000475 *** M t 0.0021671 0.000421 ***
F(1, 463) = 0.00 Prob > F =  0.9839
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level.
**　Statistically significant at the 5% level.
*    Statistically significant at the 10% level.
1) Fixed effects are not reported.
Wald test: H0: Coef.of M in (1) = Coef of M in (2)
Wald test: H0: Coef.of M in (1) = Coef of M in (2)
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Table 7-A. Trade Credit granted to and received from a GTC's related companies
(GTCs including the Kanematsu and the Toyota-Tsusho corporations)
Eq. (3) Eq. (4)
Dep. var. dlnTRRi,t Dep. var. dlnTP
R
i,t
Exp. var. Coef. Std. Err. Exp. var. Coef. Std. Err.
dlnSRi,t 0.3289683 0.076071 *** dlnP
R
i,t 0.4178538 0.079704 ***
lnTRRi,t-1-lnS
R
i,t-1 -0.068232 0.033223 ** lnTP
R
i,t-1-lnP
R
i,t-1 -0.176423 0.042933 ***
IGAPi,t-1 0.009151 0.008701 IGAPi,t-1 -0.005388 0.012578
M t 0.0011799 0.000574 ** M t 0.0022087 0.000931 **
Obs. 278 Obs. 280
Time-period 1977-2008 Time-period 1977-2008
Num. of firms 12 Num. of firms 11
R2 0.2067 R2 0.1944
System Regression of eqs. (3) and (4). 
(3) Coef. Std. Err. (4) Coef. Std. Err.
M t 0.0011799 0.000573 ** M t 0.0022087 0.000932 **
F(1, 407) = 0.88 Prob > F = 0.3474
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level.
**　Statistically significant at the 5% level.
*    Statistically significant at the 10% level.
1) Fixed effects are not reported.
Table 7-B. Trade Credit granted to and received from GTCs' related companies
(GTCs excluding the Kanematsu and the Toyota-Tsusho corporations)
Eq. (3) Eq. (4)
Dep. var. dlnTRRi,t Dep. var. dlnTP
R
i,t
Exp. var. Coef. Std. Err. Exp. var. Coef. Std. Err.
dlnSRi,t 0.3474306 0.084453 *** dlnP
R
i,t 0.3421041 0.075857 ***
lnTRRi,t-1-lnS
R
i,t-1 -0.080475 0.036776 ** lnTP
R
i,t-1-lnP
R
i,t-1 -0.140708 0.041808 ***
IGAPi,t-1 0.0059214 0.0101 IGAPi,t-1 -0.01865 0.011735
M t 0.0013342 0.000631 ** M t 0.0027727 0.000994 ***
Obs. 215 Obs. 217
Time-period 1977-2008 Time-period 1977-2008
Num. of firms 9 Num. of firms 8
R2 0.2427 R2 0.1641
System Regression of eqs. (3) and (4). 
(3) Coef. Std. Err. (4) Coef. Std. Err.
M t 0.0013342 0.00063 ** M t 0.0027727 0.000995 ***
F(1, 407) = 1.49 Prob > F = 0.2227
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level.
**　Statistically significant at the 5% level.
*    Statistically significant at the 10% level.
1) Fixed effects are not reported.
Wald test: H0: Coef.of M in (1) = Coef of M in (2)
Wald test: H0: Coef.of M in (1) = Coef of M in (2)
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Table 8-A. Trade Credit granted to and received from a GTC's non-related comp
(GTCs including the Kanematsu and the Toyota-Tsusho corporations)
Eq. (5) Eq. (6)
Dep. var. dlnTRNi,t Dep. var. dlnTP
N
i,t
Exp. var. Coef. Std. Err. Exp. var. Coef. Std. Err.
dlnSNi,t 0.5394249 0.042093 *** dlnP
N
i,t 0.6997541 0.066639 ***
lnTRNi,t-1-lnS
N
i,t-1 -0.084381 0.019154 *** lnTP
N
i,t-1-lnP
N
i,t-1 -0.113722 0.027667 ***
IGAPi,t-1 -0.01973 0.005246 *** IGAPi,t-1 -0.000457 0.008125
M t 0.0019977 0.000409 *** M t 0.0020719 0.000539 ***
Obs. 278 Obs. 280
Time-period 1977-2008 Time-period 1977-2008
Num. of firms 12 Num. of firms 11
R2 0.4818 R2 0.4409
System Regression of eqs. (5) and (6). 
(5) Coef. Std. Err. (6) Coef. Std. Err.
M t 0.0019977 0.000408 *** M t 0.0020719 0.00054 ***
F(1, 527) = 0.01 Prob > F = 0.9127
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level.
**　Statistically significant at the 5% level.
*    Statistically significant at the 10% level.
1) Fixed effects are not reported.
Table 8-B. Trade Credit granted to and received from GTCs' non-related compan
(GTCs excluding the Kanematsu and the Toyota-Tsusho corporations)
Eq. (5) Eq. (6)
Dep. var. dlnTRNi,t Dep. var. dlnTP
N
i,t
Exp. var. Coef. Std. Err. Exp. var. Coef. Std. Err.
dlnSNi,t 0.4924934 0.044331 *** dlnP
N
i,t 0.6759139 0.075883 ***
lnTRNi,t-1-lnS
N
i,t-1 -0.571413 0.021023 *** lnTP
N
i,t-1-lnP
N
i,t-1 -0.097426 0.030686 ***
IGAPi,t-1 -0.018783 0.006451 *** IGAPi,t-1 0.003608 0.00899
M t 0.0019856 0.000474 *** M t 0.0019373 0.000545 ***
Obs. 215 Obs. 217
Time-period 1977-2008 Time-period 1977-2008
Num. of firms 9 Num. of firms 8
R2 0.4008 R2 0.4036
System Regression of eqs. (5) and (6). 
(5) Coef. Std. Err. (6) Coef. Std. Err.
M t 0.0019856 0.000473 *** M t 0.0019373 0.000546 ***
F(1, 527) = 0.00 Prob > F = 0.9466
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level.
**　Statistically significant at the 5% level.
*    Statistically significant at the 10% level.
1) Fixed effects are not reported.
Wald test: H0: Coef.of M in (1) = Coef of M in (2)
Wald test: H0: Coef.of M in (1) = Coef of M in (2)
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Figure 1. Transactions and Trade Credit for All GTCs to All 
Trading Partners (mill. yen) , Source : Financial Statements
←left scale (Total Sales, Purchases) (Total TR, TP) right scales →
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Figure 2. All GTCs' Sales to and Their Purchases from 
Related and Non-Related Firms (mill. yen)
Source: Financial Statements
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Figure 3. All GTCs' Trade Receivables and Trade Payables  for 
Related and Non-Related Firms (mill. yen),
Source: Financial statements
TR (related) TP (related) TR (non-related) TP (non-related)
 
 
  
 
 
